1. There never were enough deserters to make up an army that could take on the SAA;
2. He never commanded soldiers in the field given his status as an aircraft engineer;
3. He had little brains.
But you can’t keep a good man down. His efforts to exert control over his fledgling force of flops resulted in his being shunted aside by a new, and even more incompetent officer, by the name of Mustafa Al-Shaykh, known more for his slickness with the ladies than leading cohorts of warriors into battle. This upset Mr. Al-As’ad who always felt that he was the founding father of the Fake Syrian Army. As time went on, NATO realized that the entire command structure of the FSA was peopled by emotionally disturbed, marginalized, anti-minoritarian, bigoted refuse from the Syrian Armed Forces. Enter an even more inept general – Salim Idris. That was the last straw.
Al-As’ad, never one to tolerate the presence of trolls more incompetent than himself, started to act “uppity”. His snide remarks about Idris made the rounds at the Turkish-supplied FSA base at Apaydin. To address his pique at being ignored, he tried to undermine Idris’s power by linking up with other yokels like himself and issue orders completely at odds with those from the FSA command. Thus, his jaunt in Mayaadeen.
Sometimes the courage displayed by an officer can inspire soldiers to greater heights in combat. Or so Al-As’ad thought. He arranged a trip to “examine” the facilities at the Mayaadeen base which was abandoned by the SAA on order of General Al-Fureij because, as the latter said at a press conference, the base had no military value. But, to Al-As’ad, his scoffing at danger would propel him back to a position of power that would challenge the worthless authority of general Idris.
SyrPer was wrong to have published, three days ago, the death or comatose condition of Al-As’ad. In truth, that was the message from Syria at a time when insufficient facts were available. As it turned out, the perpetrators of the act did not want to kill Al-As’ad. Instead, they wanted to send him a mafia-like message to “cool down or else”. That is why only enough explosive was used to maim him. If they killed him, it would look as though the Syrian government was able to reach him and take credit for another rat’s death.
The decision to chastise Al-As’ad, according to SyrPer sources in Damascus, was taken by the American terrorism-enablers in Incirlik. With the consent of Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s head of MIT (their CIA) and the cooperation of the Mossad, the operation which would silence Al-As’ad went ahead. An agent of the Mossad who spoke Arabic, was embedded with Jabhat Al-Nusra and posed as an Arab, was placed in Dayr El-Zor. There he waited for Al-As’ad to appear in his car with his chauffeur. According to the narrative, Al-As’ad and his driver got out of the car to look at the abandoned base. That was the time the Mossad agent delivered the goods in the form of a remote-controlled bomb triggered by a cell-phone. The rest is obvious.
What is interesting is that my sources tell me that the same group which killed our generals on July 18, 2012, and who killed Sakine Cansiz in Paris and who blew up Al-As’ad are one and the same. The sophistication and planning reflect the existence of state actors with substantial capabilities and assets. We doubt you’ll hear very much in the future from Colonel Al-As’ad.