Boo-Hoo-Hoo. Zionist rapists and plunderers commiserate over the battering they received from HZB in Lebanon.
What a difference 39 years make. In the 1967 War, the plucky Russian Jews smashed Egypt’s, Syria’s, Iraq’s and Jordan’s armies in a mere 6 days. A jubilant world press exuberantly crowned the Zionist Army with wreaths and nosegays in praise of their stunning conquest of the Sinai, Golan and West Bank. Then, some years later, with an effusive vainglory, the Zionist Occupation Army struck Lebanon’s Hizbollah after the Lebanese group penetrated Palestine’s borders on July 12, 2006 and killed 3 uniformed terrorists while taking 2 prisoner. And so started the Zionist-HZB War that was to see the Lebanese militia, trained and armed by Syria and Iran, beat the stuffing out of these Russian/Ukrainian/Polish rodents.
This book titled “We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-‘Israeli’ War” was written by Matt M. Matthews and published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center/Combat Studies Institute Press in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 2008 discusses the prelude to the war and how the Zionist armed forces had become so accustomed to arresting Palestinian preteens and old women that it had lost its original zeal and determination. Oh, the sources are, for the most part, retired Zionist terrorists like Dr. Gil Ariely, “a reserve major and Chief Knowledge Officer” who took time out of his busy day planning murders for Palestinians at Fort Leavenworth, and Adam Harmon, “author, ‘Israeli’ soldier and American citizen” who provided “helpful” information about the Zionist withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the assassination of Brigadier General Erez Gerstein. And there were other miserable Zionist occupiers and apartheid aficionados who made up the list of acknowledged vermin. In no place did the author interview any Syrian officers or Hizbollah fighters.
It was the time of PM Ehud Olmert, the hommus-loving Ukrainian Khazar who made a mess of his own reputation by doing what most Arabian leaders do: accept bribes, threaten witnesses and shake down sheikhs. He assured then-president George W. Bush that the invasion of Lebanon would be “quick and decisive” and we all remember that flatulent look on G.W.’s face when he discussed the plucky Zionist operation and how it would end well for his Chosen People and the West.
Matthews writes candidly about the capabilities of the Zionist Army; how the ground campaign revealed an army confused by its new doctrine and how soldiers were deficient in training and equipment. There were problems especially with tank crewmen and standoff firepower that simply did not effectively affect the battles in Lebanon. He discusses how Zionism gave priority to air power while neglecting ground forces.
He refers to HZB’s tactics as a “masterful campaign” and how the group turned Zionism’s withdrawal from Lebanon into a “humiliating rout”. Hints were laid down by HZB years before the 2006 War such as when on February 28, 1999 during the occupation of South Lebanon a convoy of vehicles descended a mountain road near Kafr Shab’ah during which a Zionist Brigadier General whose reputation was for invincibility, indefatigability and immortality, sat in his armor-plated Mercedes driven by a Lebanese traitor – a renegade from the Lebanese Army – Chief Warrant Officer ‘Imaad Abu-Reesh. The car was blown up by an IED and the Zionist general, Erez Gerstein, was dry-roasted as his entourage watched helplessly.
Matthews also discusses the 13 principles of HZB’s overall strategy in dealing with the Zionist enemy, such as, attacking the weak elements and avoiding the strong ones; protecting your own fighters; striking only when success is assured; the use of surprise; hitting and running; proper analysis of the enemy’s weaknesses; the necessity of constant movement; making the enemy constantly fearful and anxious; racking up small victories; maintaining high morale and debunking the enemy’s superiority; the use of visual media; the use of the local population; and hurting the enemy without giving him opportunities to retaliate. Matthews writes that the 13 principles provided a solid basis for victory.
And just as effective, were the American-made TOW wire-guided anti-tank rockets which, according to Matthews, went through the Southern Lebanese Army’s and the “IDF”s’ window slits like gnats on steroids. He didn’t quite put it that way, but, you get the idea.
By January of 2000, some of you might remember how the South Lebanon Army was demoralized by the assassination of their louse-ridden, scum-eating cockroach, ‘Aql Haashim, when HZB managed to place a large bomb inside his house blowing him up into a multitude of mephitic mist-molecules.
On May 23, 2000, the Southern Lebanese Army had “disintegrated”. Shi’ite brigades pulled back whilst Druze units simply evaporated. The speed with which the settler army and the traitors moved toward the northern borders of Palestine shocked everyone. Ehud Barak, the Zionist Apartheid State’s then-PM promised a withdrawal, but, nothing like the stampede to get out as fast as possible. Zionist newspapers called it a “Day of Humiliation”. Experts did not mince words: The Zionist Entity was defeated by HZB – no doubt about it.
I can remember that day when the settlers move out. The streets of Dearborn, Michigan, were filled with throngs of celebrating Lebanese and other Arabs. Young men drove down the summery streets in cars with many waving their hands at onlookers and screaming: “Victory!” – “Victory”. It was like a dream.
HZB fighters proclaim victory over the Zionist army of settlers and the SLA. (Image: Maruf Khatib, Getty Images)
This was the birth of UNIFIL. The UNSC endorsed the infamous “BLUE LINE” that separated Lebanon from Occupied Palestine. SC Resolution 425 was also enacted calling for Zionism’t withdrawal from the Lebanon. The idea of UNIFIL was to permit the Lebanese Army to undertake its obligations to protect Lebanon’s southern border. Well, even Matthews, had to admit that that was a tall order for an army that was essentially a Boy Scout troop. HZB Deputy Secretary General, Shaykh Na’eem Qaassim argues pretty much the same thing in several interviews.
But, SC Resolution also granted to the Zionist State the right to remain in the infamous Sheb’ah Farms located at the very northern extremity of the Golan Heights. The Zionist government lobbied hard for this concession in order to maintain (1) the image of having secured something from their disastrous frolic in Lebanon and (2) to keep an elevated outpost at the confluence of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian territory enabling them to keep an eye out for trouble. Then-Lebanese President, the inarticulate, but well-intentioned Emile Lahoud, insisted that no peace could take place unless all Arab lands were evacuated.
HZB began preparation for its next confrontation with the Zionist Entity.
According to Matthews, HZB’s Secretary General, Shaykh Hassan Nassrallah, was convinced that the Zionist Entity had no stomach for long and bloody wars. He viewed Zionist society in Occupied Palestine as “weak as a spider web”. He also figured out, accurately, that the next war would see Zionists using stand-off air power as a substitute for the much more exposed ground forces. He charted his course accordingly.
Nassrallah acquired Katyusha rocket launchers from Syria which had great access to these weapon systems. He organized rocket units south of the Litaani River with their tubes aimed menacingly at northern Palestine. Matthews describes a tactic perfected by HZB to avoid stand-off Zionist air assaults on Katyusha bases. Simply put, the Katyusha unit would keep the machinery disassembled until a spotter confirmed the absence of Zionist aircraft, after which the unit would assemble the rocket and launchers to fire at northern Palestine with “remotely controlled or timer-based mechanisms.” The process took no more than 28 seconds and the units were protected in underground bunkers designed to survive heavy air strikes.
Matthews also discusses the doctrinal foundation for HZB’s tactics. He debunk Zionist thinking that the doctrine HZB used was of Iranian provenience. Instead, he posits that North Korea is the source and that N. Korea oversaw the evolution of all HZB’s undergrounds facilities and logistical methodology. The IRGC even stated that the Korreans helped HZB to dig and extend a 25 km underground tunnel.
Matthews goes on to describe how HZB managed to master “the delicate art of counter-signals intelligence”; how HZB converted Zionist agents in South Lebanon so as to give the IDF fake Intel. HZB was able to demolish a large spy ring run by the MOSSAD and gave its enemies totally false information regarding the location of its bases. When HZB concluded that the IDF would focus on key emplacements, HZB’s strategists eliminated “key emplacements” so the Zionist invaders would have nothing to hit.
HZB’s construct was unique in that it was not a conventional army nor a conventional guerrilla fighting machine. It was something of an hybrid.
TO MY READERS: BECAUSE I AM EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS WITH THE PLATFORM, I AM GOING TO DIVIDE MY REVIEW OF THE BOOK INTO PARTS. I HOPE THAT WILL NOT BE AN INCONVENIENCE.
NEWS AND COMMENT:
Here’s a POCO-focused article for those interested in post-colonial advice and rehab. It’s from John Esquire: