A rag-tag group of insurgents? Hardly. This is the HZB Zionism had to face in 2006. An army of guerillas with brains.
In this Second Part of our analysis of the book ” We Were Caught Unprepared” by Matt M. Matthews, the author describes how the withdrawal of Zionist forces from Lebanon in 2000 left a bitter taste in the mouths of the Settler Army’s high command. And so, they began preparation for the next round.
There were some problems, however, along the way. The Second Intifadha started and the Russian/Ukrainian settlers had to deal with Palestinian children and old women which sapped their strength although it is certain that the ordinary Zionist soldier enjoyed the ease with which he or she could torment the indigenous population. This kind of training, essentially in bar-bouncing, was not the right kind as the high command found out when it had to use these same troops to deal with HZB.
Also, from 2004 to 2006, HZB continued to pressure the Zionist Settler State with Katyushas and kidnappings, many of which resulted in deaths for their troops. This reached a boiling point finally when the Zionist State finally invaded the Lebanon.
But, what doctrine should the enemy follow in dealing with HZB in the event the decision to invade is taken? Here Matthews discusses two doctrines: the first is the EBO or Effects-based Operations while the second was SOD or Systemic Operational Design. All this might sound like mumbo-jumbo to any reader, yet, it was precisely this kind of debate which brought the Zionist Army into its most degrading defeat ever.
EBO was a product of “think tank” studies. It is based on the idea that modern technology gives its owner a massive advantage over the enemy with “smart bombs” and electronic warfare instruments that allow a quick and lethal blows to stagger the enemy and disrupt its planning. The party which has such technology can deploy it in a more relaxed way avoiding many of the casualties incident to conventional doctrine. The war in Bosnia was an example of how advanced air power could be used to crush an enemy without the need for ground troops. Many in the Zionist Apartheid military were proponents of precisely this kind of doctrine.
SOD was a method of designing a war machine drawing heavily on “post modern French philosophy, literary theory, architecture and psychology.” If this sounds like using Mad Magazine as a blueprint for future battles, don’t assume that is far-fetched. Like Hegel’s or Husserl’s phenomenology, students of this peculiar kind of doctrine had to learn new terminology, a time-wasting and inutile avocation.
Believe or not, SOD was adopted by the newly appointed Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, the first Air Force officer to hold that position since the creation of the Zionist Abomination. It flopped along with Halutz as you all know. Many Zionist officers were afraid to vocally point out the shortcomings of this new way of looking at war.
As 2006 rolled around, Zionist soldiers had developed a proficiency in arresting 16 year old boys and elderly Palestinians. This was hardly the kind of training needed to take on the superbly trained HZB, as the Zionist cockroaches found out to their eternal chagrin.
In June 2006, HZB decided to up the ante on the Zionist State planning a “meticulous” operation to kidnap Zionist soldiers.
“On the night of 11 July, IDF monitors picked up several reports of contact along the electronic border fence near milepost 105. Shortly after these movement reports, an IDF reserve patrol reported 20 Hizbollah fighters near the same location. Amazingly, it appears this information never filtered down to the reserve soldiers preparing to conduct the day patrol in the milepost 105 sector.”
The Zionist reserve soldiers were preparing to go home once their patrol ended and threw their civilian luggage on to their HMMWVs without the usual and required orders. Unfortunately, HZB fighters, although spotted, detonated an IED as two vehicles sped by. Suddenly, several rockets were fired at the two APCs resulting in 3 dead Zionist with 4 others wounded. HZB rushed the burning vehicles and took two soldiers hostage. This was at approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 12, 2006.
Zionist soldiers tried to effectuate the rescue of their litter-mates but failed miserably. At 9:39 a.m., helicopters arrived to find the smoldering wreckage without hide nor hair of HZB fighters.
At around 11:00 a.m. Zionist armor encroached on to Lebanese soil trying to locate HZB’s escape route. Instead, a Merkava tank and its entire crew of 4 went up in flames as it drove over a remote-controlled IED. The author of this book describes the Zionist reaction as “inept” and concludes this part with the words: “Sadly, for Is——l, the worst was yet to come.”
Dan Halutz, an air force general, Ehud Olmert (the author mistakenly calls him “Yossi Olmert”) and Defense Minister Amir Peretz put their heads to together to plan a response to this affront. Halutz did not know how to control an army on the ground. Olmert did his military duty just like Al Gore, as a journalist. Amir Peretz was a Moroccan labor leader who spent his military time changing oil on tanks. Essentially, it was Larry, Moe and Curly up against the HZB war machine.
HZB warriors grin at Zionist incompetence and cowardice. Fighters like these kidnapped 2 Zionist reservists from burning armored vehicles. (Photo: China Daily)
Halutz convinced his superiors to mount an air campaign to destroy Lebanon, force HZB out of the South causing them to disarm. The author quotes a Zionist writer who described what was to happen as “a witches brew of high tech fantasies and basic unpreparedness.” In any case, Halutz’s air campaign did destroy the building housing Al-Manaar TV, HZB’s mouthpiece. However, Halutz overestimated the value of the air force’s destruction of 54 Zilzaal rocket launchers, claiming the Zionist Settler State had now won the war. Nyuk. Nyuk.
Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah was shocked by the severity of the Zionist air strikes on Beirut’s International Airport and admitted to the mistake of taking 2 Zionist soldiers hostage ot to mention killing 8 others. He retaliated by ordering the launching of an Iranian-made C-802 Noor anti-ship missile which struck a Zionist naval vessel killing 4 of its crew. The ship hobbled back to its base. Of interest was the admission that the ship did not have its defenses turned on because the Zionists did not know HZB had these weapons.
The war was on. HZB fired long-range missiles at Haifa (where my father was born and my mother was raised). The missiles killed 8 Zionists. The Apartheid State killed 31 Lebanese civilians. An American observer put Zionism’s impact on HZB at 7 percent of “Hizbollah’s military resources”. And on July 14, Zionist “Intelligence” concluded that a ground war was needed. In the meantime, as these feckless Zionists evaluated their positions, reports were coming in that “Hizbollah units were fighting tenaciously to hold their positions on the first ridgeline overlooking Is—–el”.